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11 Introduction
There are things that money cannot buy. Scarce medical resources are as-
signed through priority lists almost everywhere around the world. A fraction
of green cards in the US is allocated by lottery. When demand exceeds sup-
ply, a large number of goods are rationed using queues, rather than by rising
their prices to clear the market. More generally, queues, lotteries and priority
lists are widely adopted mechanisms, as opposed to markets, for the alloca-
tion of public resources (e.g. goods, subsidies or services), in both developed
and developing countries.1
For example, in February 2009 about 1,200 EU farming grants, worth up
to 5,000 pounds each, were allocated on a ¯rst-come ¯rst-served basis to those
who turned up in person at government buildings in Norther Ireland. Some
farmers queued since Sunday ahead of Tuesday's morning opening. Another
example is provided by city housing programs in New York, intended to
provide a®ordable homes to middle and low-income New Yorkers. The city
housing plan calls for 165,000 new housing units between 2003 and 2013.
Lotteries are used to allocate the units that become available (for sale and for
rent) at below market prices. Income requirements are set for participation
in the lotteries.
The two examples highlight the trade-o® that arise when the allocation is
non monetary. Waiting in line generates a deadweight loss. However, queues
may serve as screening devices, if the resources at stake are likely to generate
higher value in the hands of those who are willing to wait in line the most for
them. Instead, priority lists and lotteries cause no loss of time, but do not
perform a ¯ne screening. Therefore, a question arises, about how to design
an optimal mechanism in this environment.
To address this issue, I investigate the design of mechanisms for the al-
location of a number of identical indivisible objects to a set of heterogenous
risk-neutral agents. The agents have unitary demand and independent pri-
vate values. The novelty of my approach is that values represent the max-
1There is an extensive literature surveying and discussing institutional details of non-
market allocations. For example, see Calabresi and Bobbit (1978), Elster (1992) and
(1989), Okun (1975) and Walzer (1983).
2imum times that agents are willing to wait to obtain a good. In contrast
to the standard transferable utility case the designer faces a trade-o® be-
tween allocative e±ciency and cost minimization.2 Increasing the e±ciency
of the allocation requires that agents are screened according to their private
valuations. However, eliciting private information is costly. My main contri-
bution is to characterize the set of ex-ante Pareto optimal direct allocation
mechanisms (Proposition 1), and show how optimal mechanisms can be im-
plemented through queuing games, priority lists and lotteries (Proposition 2).
It turns out that if all the hazard rates of the prior distributions of values
are monotonically increasing (e.g. values comes from a normal, uniform, etc.),
then the optimal mechanism does not exploit any private information and
takes the form of a priority list (or a lottery, if agents are ex-ante identical).
That is, goods are allocated to the agents which have, ex-ante, the highest
expected values. The use of lotteries and priority lists (often in the form of
point systems) is widespread. Conventional wisdom attributes their success
to their fairness properties. A di®erent rationale is provided here in terms
of e±ciency. These mechanisms prevent agents from engaging in wasteful
rent seeking activities. On the contrary, full screening of private information
is optimal, if, and only if, all hazard rates are monotonically decreasing. In
the symmetric case, a standard queue approximately implements the optimal
mechanism. In general, when hazard rates are not monotonic, the optimal
mechanism may require both screening and pooling of values. In this case,
implementation in the symmetric case is obtained by using a queue where the
set of possible arrival time is restricted in order to induce pooling of values in
equilibrium. It is remarkable that, because when the support of valuations is
bounded the hazard rate must be increasing in a neighborhood of its upper
bound, it is generically optimal to put a cap on queues. That is preventing
people from joining the queue too early by assigning the same priority to all
those who arrive earlier than the appropriately de¯ned time threshold.
The feature that the designer is not able to condition the allocation of
the goods on the willingness to pay of the agents is not explicitly modeled
and will be taken as exogenous. However, there are several reasons why it
2In a setting with monetary values and no budget constraints it is possible to achieve the
¯rst best outcome by using a Vickrey mechanism and redistributing expected payments.
3may not be optimal to allocate scarce resources to those that are able to
pay the most for them, even when the designer only cares for the welfare
of the agents involved.3 First, as in the two examples above, agents may
have a common monetary value for the goods, but still have heterogenous
values in terms, for example, of the time that they are willing to wait in
line. Second, one can argue that markets are not equitable. In fact, agents
may be severely budget constrained relative to the expected price of the
good. Therefore, their willingness to pay may be di®erent from their ability
to pay.4 Third, because allocating the goods on the basis of the ability to
pay may contrast our sense of justice, it can create externalities which are
di±cult to internalize.5
A brief review of the existing literature concludes this section. Holt and
Sherman (1982) provided the ¯rst game theoretic analysis of queues. They
study equilibria of speci¯c queuing games with incomplete information. The
works of Taylor, Tsui and Zhu (2003) and Koh, Yang and Zhu (2006) com-
pare, computationally, the relative performance of queues and lotteries under
speci¯c value distributions. In contrast to the papers above, I provide, within
the same environment, a closed form solution to the problem of designing an
optimal mechanism. Closely related environments, where agent compete for
a set of homogenous goods by engaging in costly e®ort or money burning,
are studied in a number of papers in the context of di®erent applications:
McAfee and McMillan (1992), Chakravarty and Kaplan (2006), Yoon (2009),
and Hartline and Roughgarden (2008). My results are signi¯cantly more gen-
3If an institution has a direct interest in screening individuals on the basis of speci¯c
characteristics a distribution based on the willingness to pay may not be optimal (e.g.
academic prizes are not awarded to those that promise to pay the most for them). For
more on this see Condorelli (2008).
4A related argument applies when the allocation is made on the basis of the willingness
to wait in line (e.g. old people may ¯nd it more di±cult to wait in line). However, men
are endowed in principle with the same amount of time and, moreover, there is substantial
evidence that queues are preferred to markets on grounds of fairness (see Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler (1986)).
5For example, during the US Civil War one could avoid serving in the Union army by
paying a certain amount of money. This appears to have been the cause for a number of
riots. See Calabresi and Bobbit (1978) for an elaboration of this argument. Note that if
externalities are present, the designer also needs to ban resale.
4eral than those of the ¯rst three papers, as I consider an asymmetric setting
and adopt much weaker restrictions on the distributions of values (i.e. non
monotone hazard rates). Hartline and Roughgarden (2008) contains a re-
sult which was obtained independently and is very similar to my Proposition
1. In contrast to my analysis, the authors discuss applications to computer
science and do not deal with the practical implementation of the optimal
mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; section 2 presents the model;
section 3 describes the optimal direct mechanism; section 4 describes the
practical implementation of the optimal direct mechanism; section 5 con-
cludes the paper.
2 The Model
Let N = f1;:::;ng represent the set of agents. There are m < n identical
goods to allocate. Agents are risk neutral and demands one good only. Each
agent has private valuation for the good, vi 2 Vi ´ [vi;vi) with v < v · 1.
Let V = V1 £¢¢¢£Vn, v = (v1;:::;vn) and v¡i = fvj : j 2 N nig. The pri-
vate valuation of someone represents the maximum time (measured in hours,
minutes, etc.) that he is willing to wait in line to obtain the good. Prefer-
ences are quasilinear with respect to time. Furthermore, I assume that all
agents su®er a disutility, normalized to zero, if they do not obtain the good.
Therefore, an agent that obtains a good with probability 0 · pi · 1 and
sustain a time-cost (i.e. waits in line an amount of time) equal to ci ¸ 0 has
utility pivi ¡ ci.6 Unitary demand is modeled by setting a maximum utility
of vi ¡ ci even if the agents receives more than one object. Each agent pos-
sesses a set of observable characteristics, which are common knowledge. The
agent i's observable characteristics determine the beliefs that other agents
hold about his private value. Observable characteristics are summarized by
a continuous cumulative distribution function Fi, with support in Vi, and
density fi. Individual values are assumed to be stochastically independent.
6Assuming that pivi ¡ fi(ci) and fi is increasing and commonly known (e.g. when fi
represents a wage schedule) would not provide more generality to the model.
5The task of the designer is to de¯ne an allocation mechanism whose equi-
librium outcome maximizes the weighted sum of the agents' ex-ante expected
utilities. An allocation mechanism can be any game, in which agents play
under incomplete information about their opponents' valuations, whose out-
come (for each pro¯le of actions) consist of (i) a probability distribution for
the m goods over the n agents and (ii) a vector of non-negative costs (i.e.
the amounts of time that agents wait in line). Participation in the mecha-
nism must be voluntary. Therefore any feasible allocation mechanism must
allow agents to opt out, obtaining a payo® equal to zero. I ask that the de-
signer maximizes the weighted sum of the agents' ex-ante expected utilities
because, as illustrated in Holmstrom and Myerson's (1983), a mechanism
whose equilibrium maximizes a weighted sum of agents' ex-ante expected
utilities is ex-ante incentive e±cient. That is, it is Pareto e±cient within
the set of incentive compatible mechanisms. Therefore, no other incentive
compatible mechanism can be found that makes everyone better o® prior to
the realization of private values.7
3 Optimal Direct Mechanism Design
In this section I appeal to the revelation principle and, without loss of gen-
erality, search for an optimal mechanism within the class of equivalent in-
centive compatible direct allocation mechanisms. A direct allocation mech-
anisms, hp;ci, is a mapping providing an outcome (a distribution of goods
and costs) for each pro¯le of reports from the agents. Therefore, it is a
set of functions
©
pi : V ! [0;1] ; ci : V ! IR
+ªn
i=1 such that for all v 2 V
the condition
Pn
i=1 pi(v) · m holds. In playing mechanism hp;ci the
ex-post utility to player i from announcing si when its true value is vi,
while all other players announce v¡i is vipi(si;v¡i) ¡ ci(si;v¡i). Assum-
ing that opponents are truthful, the expected utility at the interim stage
is: Ui(vi;si) = viEv¡i [pi(si;v¡i)] ¡ Ev¡i [ci(si;v¡i)]. A direct allocation
mechanism hp;ci is incentive compatible if, and only if, for all i and vi,
7If a mechanism is ex-ante incentive e±cient, there cannot be any other mechanism that
would surely be better for all, even after they receive their private information. This fact
re°ects decreasing insurance opportunities for the agents as more information is released.
6Ui(vi;vi) = maxsi2V Ui(vi;si) ¸ 0. That is, a mechanism is incentive com-
patible if truthful reporting is an equilibrium and everyone obtains a payo®
higher than zero. The next lemma o®ers a tractable characterization of in-
centive compatible direct mechanisms in terms of p only. To simplify the
notation write: Pi(vi) = Ev¡i [pi(vi;v¡i)] and Ci(vi) = Ev¡i [ci(vi;v¡i)].
Lemma 1. A direct allocation mechanism hp;ci is incentive compatible if,
and only if, for all i and vi 2 Vi:
8v
¤ 2 Vi : vi ¸ v
¤ Pi(vi) ¸ Pi(v
¤) (1a)




The proof is well known and it is omitted (see e.g. Myerson (1981)). Note
that Ci(vi) · 0 is necessary for incentive compatibility. Furthermore, because
agents cannot receive positive transfers we must have that Ci(vi) ¸ 0. This
implies that Ci(vi) = 0 for all i. One special cost rule that satis¯es (1b) for
any p is the canonical cost rule:




According to this cost rule, only the winners, or those who participate in a
lottery, sustain a cost, equal to the expected minimum value they could have,
and still obtain the good under the allocation rule.8 Observe that with the
canonical cost rule agents have a dominant strategy to report their values
truthfully (see Myerson (1981)).
There is a one to one mapping between the outcome of an incentive
compatible direct mechanism and the mechanism itself. Therefore, a direct
8To understand the meaning of expected minimum value, suppose that there is only
one good available and agent i has the highest value vi, greater than some other value v00.
Assume that p assigns the goods to agents with the highest values but values in [v0;v00)
are pooled. Furthermore, assume the remaining n¡1 agents all have values in that region.
The payment from i will be equal to 1
nv0+ n¡1
n v00. In fact, the minimum value that i could
have, and still obtain a good is v0 with probability 1=n (the probability that he would
win the lottery against the other players if he played v0) and it is v00 with the probability
(n ¡ 1)=n (which is when he would lose the lottery).
7allocation mechanism hp;ci is ex-ante incentive e±cient (i.e optimal) if it
is incentive compatible and, for some set of non-negative Pareto weights
w1;:::;wn, maximizes Ev f
Pn
i=1 wi[vipi(v) ¡ ci(v)]g. It is easy to see that,
if incentive constraints were not an issue, a ¯rst best allocation would assign
the goods to the agents with the highest weighted values at no cost. It is
a consequence of Lemma 1 that any ¯rst best allocation (i.e. unconstrained
e±cient) is not implementable, unless the allocation is dictatorial. That is,
the weights of precisely n ¡ m agents are set equal to zero.
The building blocks to construct an optimal direct mechanism under in-
complete information are the priority functions. These assign to each agent
a unique priority level for each reported value. The construction of the prior-
ity functions follows the ironing technique, as developed in Myerson (1981).






dz Gi(x) = convhHi(x)i gi(x) = G
0
i(x)
Here, convh¢i stands for the convex hull of the function.9 Where the deriva-
tive of Gi(v) is not de¯ned, we extend it using the right or left derivative.
The priority function ¸i for agent i is:
¸i(vi) = wigi(Fi(vi)) (3)
The next proposition characterizes the optimal direct mechanisms. The
statement is straightforward, but formalizing it requires a lot of notation.
Therefore I relegate in the appendix the formal statement and the proof.
Proposition 1. Fix F1;:::;Fn and w1;:::;wn. In the optimal direct mech-
anism agents report their values and the designer implements the following
outcome. The allocation rule p is: the m agents with values that achieve the
highest priority levels, as de¯ned in (3), obtain the goods and ties in priority
are broken by an equal chance lottery. The cost rule c is de¯ned in (2).
Suppose that all hazard rates of the distributions of values are mono-
tonically non-decreasing. Then, ¸i(vi) = wi E[vi] for all vi 2 Vi. In fact,
Hi is concave and therefore Gi is a straight line going from Hi(0) = 0 to
9Gi(x) is the highest convex function such that Gi(x) · Hi(x) 8x.
8Hi(1) = E[vi]. The optimal mechanism is a priority list. All agents are
ranked according to their weighted expected value. Goods are assigned to
the agents with the highest rankings, until all goods are allocated. Lotteries
resolve ties. Agents do not need to sustain any cost because the allocation
is built only on the basis of the observable characteristics (i.e. F1;:::;Fn).
The expected total value achieved by the priority list is equal to the sum of
the m highest expected values, within the n agents. Clearly, if all agents are
ex-ante symmetric and have equal weightings, then the optimal mechanism
is an equal chance lottery.
Next, consider the opposite case, where hazard rates are all monotonically
decreasing. Then ¸(vi) = wi
1¡Fi(vi)
fi(vi) . In fact, Gi is convex and so Gi(x) =
Hi(x) for all x 2 [0;1]. If agents are ex-ante identical and weighted equally,
the optimal mechanism is a full screening mechanism. That is, goods are
allocated to the agents with the highest realized values. In fact, ¸i(v) is a
strictly increasing function and for all i and j and v, ¸i(v) = ¸j(v). Here,
screening takes place up to the point where the identities of the agents that
have the highest m values are known for sure. Therefore, the expected cost
of screening is equal to mE[v(n¡m)] (where v(n¡m) indicates the n¡m highest
value out of a sample of n independent extractions from v). The total value
is given by
Pm
z=1 E[v(z)]¡mE[v(n¡m)]. If agents are ex-ante asymmetric (and
the planner adopts equal weights), then the optimal mechanism will tend to
be biased in favor of the agents that appear to have the strongest claims.10
Finally, suppose that agents are symmetric but hazard rates are not mono-
tonic. In this case there may be intervals in the type space where the priority
functions are constant (i.e. agents with di®erent values receive the same pri-
ority) and other areas where these are increasing (i.e. agents with di®erent
values receive di®erent priority). This is illustrated by the following example,
which concludes the section.
10More precisely the mechanism will favor those agents whose distribution hazard-rate
dominates those of the other agents. In fact, agent i hazard-rate dominates that of agent j
if his hazard rate is always lower than that of j. Because under a monotonically decreasing
hazard rate we have that ¸i(v) =
1¡Fi(v)
fi(v) for all v it follows that, ¯xing v, ¸j(v) < ¸i(v).
Therefore, i will get the good, even if, ex post, both i and j have the same value for
it. Recall that in the optimal auction problem the designer discriminates in favor of the
weakest bidder in order to extract higher payments from the strongest one.
9Example: Consider the problem of distributing m tests for a rare but dan-
gerous disease to a population of n > m ex-ante identical agents, whose
surplus is equally weighted by the designer. The disease can be successfully
treated once discovered, but is otherwise fatal. The occurrence of the disease
is highly correlated with lifestyle (e.g. sexual behavior, alcohol consumption).
Therefore, potential individual bene¯ts from taking the test, measured as the
likelihood of having contracted the disease, depend on private information.11
Everyone believes that individuals' values, measured as the willingness to
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0:65 if v 2 [0;1)
1:16 if v 2 (1;3]
In other words, it pools agents with values in [0;1) and agents with values in
[1;3], but screens between the two intervals. Therefore, screening is limited
to discovering whether an agent belongs to the ¯rst or the second interval.
Agents that declare a lower value obtain lower priority but are not re-
quired to sustain a cost, even if they obtain a good. Agents that declare a
value above 1 get priority in the allocation, but they are required to sustain
a positive cost if they obtain a good. This cost must be such that an agent
with value 1 is indi®erent about declaring a value of 0 or a value of 1.12 F
11In a more general heterogeneous agents formulation of this example the expected
bene¯ts may depend on a combination of private and public information.
12If, for example , n = 2 and m = 1, the expected cost sustained by a player with a





The aim of this section is to design simple mechanisms suitable for practical
applications that will implement optimal outcomes when the distribution of
values is known. Proposition 1 shows that if all hazard rates are monoton-
ically non decreasing, then the optimal mechanism is a priority list, based
only on observable characteristics, or an equal chance lottery (under full
symmetry). Practical implementation in this case is straightforward.
When the condition above is not met it seems natural to study imple-
mentation via queuing games. In a queuing game the designer announces at
some time ts that the m goods will be distributed at some future date, td. At
ts, the designer also announces the separating region, T (i.e. a closed subset
of the time interval [ts;td], which contains td). Thereafter, agents indepen-
dently (i.e. without being able to monitor each other) decide if and when to
join the queue. Agents can join the queue only once but can leave at no cost
at any point in time. Upon joining the queue agents can see who is already
in line. In general, the agent that arrives earlier gets priority, and ties are
broken instantaneously via equal chance lotteries. However, anyone arriving
outside the separating region T is counted as having joined the queue at a
later time, equal to the closest subsequent point in T. 13 As agents are indif-
ferent about when they have to wait in line, I normalize td = 0 and assume
that the designer chooses ts instead. Moreover, I can re-label the possible
arrival times in terms of the unit of times that an agent should wait if he
had to stand in line from that arrival time until td.14 Figure 1 depicts, with
an example, the timing and rules of a queuing game. Observe that depicted
arrival times are not the equilibrium ones.
13For example (see Figure 1), if the designer announces at 5:20pm that she will distribute
goods at 6pm and that the screening regions comprises the interval between 5:30pm and
5:40pm and the interval between 5:50pm and 6:00pm, then anyone arriving between 5:40pm
and 5:50pm will be counted as if he joined exactly at 5:50pm.
14For example (see Figure 1), by saying that ts = 40, that T = [0;10][[20;30] and that
agent i = 4 arrives at t4 = 5, I mean that the distribution time has been set at 40 units
of time (i.e minutes in this example) after ts, that the screening region comprises arrival
times that are at most 10 units of time earlier than td or between 20 and 30 units of time






( t’’’ , td ) is in the screening region 
t’’=20 t’’’=10
Example:  2 goods allocated to 4 agents. Distribution time at 
6:00pm and screening region  is [5:30 , 5:40] and [5:50 , 6]. 
Outcome: one good is allocated to (1); the remaining good is 
allocated to (2) or (3) via an equal chance lottery. 
t(1)=25
t’=30
( t’ ,t’’) is in the screening region 
Hereinafter, I will restrict a ttention to the case where agents are ex-ante
symmetric, the support of possible valuations is bounded, and the planner
treats the agents equally (i.e. for all i, wi = 1=n and Fi = F for some F with
support in V = [v;v], where v < v < 1).15 Under the stated hypotheses,
without loss of generality, it is possible to eliminate one variable from the
implementation problem by setting ts = v.
Therefore, for each initial distribution of values, implementation requires
identifying a queuing game, de¯ned only by T, with an equilibrium such
that every agent obtains the same interim payo® that he would obtain in the
15If the space of possible valuations is unbounded and ¸(x) is strictly increasing in some
interval [x;1), then implementation in the queueing game above can only be approximate.
In fact, the designer would need to set an in¯nitely far o® distribution time. Implementa-
tion of the asymmetric case appears di±cult in this symmetric queuing game where those
who arrive ¯rst must get priority and agents that do not get a good do not stay in line.
12optimal direct mechanism. The following statements, which restrict agents'
equilibrium behavior in the queueing game, are easily veri¯able:
1. everyone joins the queue at some point (but possibly at td);
2. no one joins the queue outside the separating region T;
3. every agent that, upon joining the queue, observes that he has no
chance of obtaining a good, immediately leaves the queue;
4. each agent joins the queue at a time such that he would be willing to
wait until td in order to obtain a good for sure;
5. every agent that, upon joining the queue, expects to obtain a good,
remains in line until td.
Hence, a Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies in the queuing game de¯ned
by T can be fully characterized by a set of functions: ti : Vi ! T with
i = 1;:::;n. A strategy ti for agent i maps his possible values into arrival
times within the separating region.
To achieve practical implementation, I start from the optimal direct mech-
anism hp;ci and ¯nd a permissible cost rule ^ c that satis¯es (1b) and where
only the winners pay a cost, independent of the realized values of the oppo-
nents. To do this I ¯rst need to resolve the uncertainty relative to lotteries
that may arise in pooling regions. At this purpose, I associate to p the ran-
dom vector `p. Finally, call t(vi) the cost in terms of waiting time that would
be assigned according to the new cost rule ^ c by the optimal direct mechanism
to an agent with a given value if he gets a good. Implementation works by
including in the separating region T all those arrival times that imply an
amount of waiting time, such that, in the optimal direct mechanism with the
new cost rule, there is some agent with some value that would be required
to wait for that amount of time in the case that he gets a good. I have the
following proposition. The proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 2. Fix F(¢);m;n and let hp;ci be an optimal mechanism ac-




vector of 1 and 0, where 1 at position i indicates the award of an object to
13agent i while 0 indicates that i will not obtain a good. Construct its probability
function by de¯ning the marginal distributions as Probf`
p
i (v) = 1g = pi(v)




i (v) = m. De¯ne, for all vi 2 [v;v],






i (v) = 1]
Finally, de¯ne the separating region T as the image of t(¢) over [v;v],
T ´ fx 2 [v;v] : t(v) = x for some v 2 [v;v]g
For any v, everyone with value vi arriving at t(vi) in the queuing game de¯ned
by the designer, combined together with statements 1-5 above, is a Bayesian
equilibrium that implements the optimal direct mechanism.
A few remarks are due. First, note that the formulation is general, as
a lottery can be implemented by including only the distribution time in
the screening region. Second, while the optimal direct mechanism is ex-post
implementable, the queuing game does not admit a dominant strategy for the
agents. Third, because the support of possible values is bounded, the hazard
rate of the distribution of values will be increasing in a neighborhood of vi,
implying that the separating region will always exclude arrival times close to
vi. This means that enforcing a cap on the queue (i.e. a limit on the advance
with which people can join the line) is always bene¯cial for welfare. Finally,
it is interesting that this implementation method can be used more generally
in mechanism design. In fact, Proposition 2 allows ¯rst-price implementation
(i.e. only winners pay their bids) of Myerson's optimal auction when agents
are symmetric but the regularity condition on the distributions of values is
not met.
To conclude this section, I provide an example that clari¯es the construc-
tion of the optimal, direct and indirect, mechanism in a symmetric environ-
ment where hazard rates are not monotonic.
Example: A government must distribute m food stamps to n citizens of a
given town, which are treated as ex-ante identical. Individual values, i.e.
the willingness to spend time in line to obtain the subsidy, are distributed
according to Fk(v) = vk with v 2 [0;1] and known k 2 (0;1]. Distributions in
14this family are everywhere decreasing (density is L-shaped), and distributions
with a higher k ¯rst order stochastically dominate distributions with lower
k (when k = 1 this is a uniform distribution). The inverse hazard rate is
increasing in (0;(1 ¡ k)
1
k) and decreasing in ((1 ¡ k)
1
k;1). Therefore, as k
increases, the interval where the inverse hazard rate is decreasing gets larger
(it always contains the upper bound of the support). Let p(k) 2 [0;1] be the







(1+k)(1¡p) for given k. Then, the





v1¡k(1 ¡ vk)k¡1 if v 2 [0;p(k)
1
k)
p(k)1¡k[1 ¡ p(k)k]k¡1 if v 2 [p(k)
1
k;1]
It can be shown that both p(k) and F
¡1
k (p(k)) = p(k)1=k are decreasing in
k. Therefore, as expected, as k increases and the density puts more weight
on high types, the optimal mechanism increases the share of pooling in the
space of values. A pro¯le of costs can be constructed that implements the
allocation rule.
Turning to practical implementation, assume for simplicity that n = 2





E[vj j vj < vi] if vi · p(k)1=k




1+p(k) if vi > p(k)1=k
The queuing game is as follows: set ts = 1 and set the screening region as the
image of the function t, i.e T ´ [0;t(x)]. Note that when k = 1 this becomes
a lottery, as the only arrival time in T is the distribution time.F
16We have that ¹ ci(vi;vj) = 0 if `
p
i (v) = 0 and ¹ ci(vi;vj) = minfvj;xg if `
p
i (v) = 1. Note
that `
p
i (v) = 0 if vi < vj and vi < p(k)1=k or if vi > p(k)1=k and vj > p(k)1=k but the
equal chance lottery favors agent j, while it is equal to 1 otherwise. Taking account of
expectations produces the following (^ ci(vi;vj) = 0 if `
p





E[vj j vj < vi] if `
p










i (v) = 1, vi ¸ p(k)1=k
155 Conclusion
In this paper I have shown how to construct a mechanism for the e±cient
allocation of a set of scarce resources in an environment where money can-
not be used to transfer utility but agents can still signal their value for the
good at stake by engaging in wasteful activities, like waiting in line. In
this context, selecting an allocation mechanism involves a trade-o® between
allocative e±ciency and cost minimization that is not present when infor-
mation about individual values can be obtained without waste of resources.
The mechanisms I obtain are practically implementable, in the sense that
they work essentially as priority lists, lotteries or queues, where the set of
possible arrival times is appropriately restricted.
From a positive perspective, this paper suggests that one reason behind
the success of di®erent mechanisms in di®erent environments may be their
ability to balance the need to achieve an e±cient allocation and the cost
of wasteful rent-seeking activities that agents perform in order to secure an
award. One normative implication, that is robust to di®erent speci¯cations of
the distribution of beliefs, is that standard queues, often observed in practice,
are rarely optimal. It always pays to put a cap on the queue in such a way
to prevent agents to join the queue too early.
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17Appendix
Proposition 1 For each v, the set of agents is partitioned in a chain of
ordered sets, M1(v);M2(v);::: according to their priority levels. Formally,
set M0(v) ´ ; and de¯ne Mx(v) recursively as follows:
Mx+1(v) ´
(
i 2 N n
[
z·x




De¯ne Ij(v) as the set of agents with the highest priority levels, up to those
included in Mj(v): Ij(v) = fi 2
S
z·j Mz(v)g.
Let jXj denote the cardinality of an arbitrary set X. Pick the highest
natural number s such that jIs(v)j · m. Call k = m ¡ jIs(v)j, and r =
jMs+1(v)j. An incentive compatible symmetric direct allocation mechanism
hp;ci maximizes (7) if, and only if, 8i 2 N; 8v 2 V n: 17
pi(v) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if i 2 Is(v)
k=r if i 2 Ms+1(v)
0 otherwise
The cost rule can be any set of functions c such that for all i and v 2 Vi:




Proof: As a ¯rst step towards the solution to the problem, let us rewrite


























17I restrict attention to symmetric mechanisms. This is without loss of generality here
because considering asymmetric mechanisms will not improve on the symmetric solution
obtained.














pi(v) · m 8v 2 V
Pi(v) ¸ Pi(v
¤) 8i 2 N; 8v;v
¤ 2 Vi : v ¸ v
¤
It can readily be seen that the candidate solution satis¯es the ¯rst constraint
above, and that c satis¯es (1b). To prove that (1a) is also satis¯ed, note that
¸i(v) is the derivative of a convex function and therefore it is monotonically
increasing. Then, 8v¡i p(v) is increasing in vi, which implies that Pi(¢) is
also increasing. Now, let us sum and subtract ¸i(vi)=wi inside the objective































Consider the ¯rst term of the expression above. It is equal to zero: Hi(vi) =
Gi(vi) and Hi(vi) = Gi(vi), because Gi is the convex hull of the continuous
function Hi and thus they coincide at endpoints (the continuity of Hi follows










19It is easy to see that the candidate solution hp;ci maximizes the ¯rst sum
as it puts all the probability on the players for whom ¸i(vi) is maximal. To
conclude the proof, I now show that the second term is equal to zero. It must
always be non negative, as 8v 2 [vi;vi) Hi ¸ Gi. That it is equal to zero,
follows because Gi is the convex hull of Hi and so, whenever Hi(Fi(vi)) >
Gi(Fi(vi)), then Gi must be linear. That is, if G(x) < H(x), G00
i(x) = g0
i(x) =
0. Therefore, to conclude, ¸i(v) will be a constant in a neighborhood of vi,
which implies that Pi(v) will also be a constant.
Proposition 2 Fix F(¢);m;n and let hp;ci be an optimal mechanism accord-
ing to Proposition 1. De¯ne the random vector (`
p
1(v);:::;`p
n(v)) as a vector
of 1 and 0, where 1 at position i indicates the award of an object to agent
i while 0 indicates that i will not obtain a good. Construct its probability
function by de¯ning the marginal distributions as Probf`
p
i (v) = 1g = pi(v)




i (v) = m. De¯ne, for all vi 2 [v;v],






i (v) = 1]
Finally, de¯ne the separating region T as the image of t(¢) over [v;v],
T ´ fx 2 [v;v] : t(v) = x for some v 2 [v;v]g
For any v, everyone with value vi arriving at t(vi) in the queuing game de¯ned
by the designer, combined together with statements 1-5 above, is a Bayesian
equilibrium that implements the optimal direct mechanism.
Proof: First, I show that if everyone follows the candidate equilibrium strat-
egy in the queuing game, then the outcome of the optimal direct mechanism
is implemented. Second, I show that, the candidate equilibrium is indeed an
equilibrium. For any v 2 V n, suppose that everyone arrives at t(vi). Ac-
cording to statements 3 and 5, an agent leaves immediately if he does not
get a good, but otherwise remains in line until the distribution time. In the
queuing game goods are allocated to the agents that join the queue earli-
est, within the set of arrival times T, and lotteries resolve ties immediately.
Hence, if everyone uses arrival strategy t(vi) goods are allocated to those
with the highest t(vi) and lotteries resolve ties. Those that do not get a good
20do not pay any cost. Consider now the optimal direct mechanism with the ^ c
cost rule, under symmetry. As Probf`
p
i (v) = 1g = pi(v), it is easy to verify















i (v) = 1] if `
p
i (v) = 1
Incentive compatibility (1a) requires that the priority ¸(vi) in the assign-
ment is non-decreasing in the value of each agent. Furthermore, incentive
compatibility (1b) implies that agents obtaining the same priority bear the
same interim cost (i.e. ^ C(vi)). It follows that they also bear the same cost
ex-post in the case of success (i.e. ^ c(vi) when `p(v) = 1), as the cost does
not depend on the realized values of all other agents. As a consequence, t(vi)
increases when ¸(vi) increases and is constant otherwise. This proves, given
the rules of the queuing game, that the strategy considered implements the
same outcome as the optimal direct mechanism.
To conclude this proof, I need to show that this is indeed an equilibrium of
the queuing game de¯ned by the designer. Remember that i has no interest
in arriving at any time outside the relevant set de¯ned, which is the image
of t(¢). Then, if everyone plays according to t(¢), an agent i with value
vi essentially faces the choice between arriving at t(vi), or mimicking what
an agent with some other value would choose, according to the candidate
equilibrium strategy. Therefore, the payo®s are the same as in the direct
optimal mechanism. It follows that, if the agent chooses to use a strategy
other than t(vi), then he will obtain the outcome assigned to an agent with
a di®erent value in the optimal direct mechanism. But this is not possible
because the optimal direct mechanism is incentive compatible.
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